Rules or consequences? The role of ethical mindsets in moral dynamics by Michael Bashshur et al.









Universitat Pompeu Fabra and Barcelona GSE 
 
Michael R. Bashshur 
Singapore Management University 
 
Julian Rode 
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ 
 
Marc Le Menestrel 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
 
Author Note 
Gert Cornelissen, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu 
Fabra and Barcelona GSE; Michael R. Bashshur, Lee Kong Chian School of Business, 
Singapore Management University; Julian Rode, Department of Environmental Politics, 
Helmholtz Centre for Environmental Research - UFZ; Marc Le Menestrel, Department 
of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. 
This research was supported by the grant ECO2008-01768 from the Spanish 




Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Gert Cornelissen, 
Department of Economics and Business, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, Barcelona 08005, 






Recent research on the dynamics of moral behavior has documented two contrasting 
phenomena - moral consistency and moral balancing. Moral balancing refers to the 
phenomenon whereby behaving (un)ethically decreases the likelihood of doing so again 
at a later time. Moral consistency describes the opposite pattern - engaging in 
(un)ethical behavior increases the likelihood of doing so later on. Three studies support 
the hypothesis that individuals’ ethical mindset (i.e., outcome-based versus rule-based) 
moderates the impact of an initial (un)ethical act on the likelihood of behaving ethically 
in a subsequent occasion. More specifically, an outcome-based mindset facilitates moral 
balancing and a rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency. 
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Rules or Consequences? The Role of Ethical Mindsets in Moral Dynamics 
 
A British online newspaper recently headlined a story on moral dynamics with 
“How going green may make you mean – ethical consumers less likely to be kind and 
more likely to steal”. The studies by Mazar and Zhong (2010) that were reported on in 
the newspaper article demonstrated how provoking an environmentally friendly product 
choice, by offering mostly green options, made participants more likely to cheat on a 
subsequent task than participants who did not have the opportunity to make a similarly 
green choice. While a provocative headline, it was inaccurate. Clearly, the term “ethical 
consumers” would be appropriate only if participants’ (environmental) values had been 
assessed. The fact that the newspaper’s sensationalist misinterpretation was quickly 
adopted or independently produced by various media sources illustrates that “doing 
good leads to doing bad” is an intriguing idea that runs contrary to most people’s 
intuition. 
Researchers have been slow to recognize the dynamics inherent in moral 
behavior. Previous research on moral or ethical behavior was mostly limited to studying 
moral reasoning (e.g., Kohlberg, 1969) and other factors that influence episodic or one-
shot behavior, like individual differences (e.g., centrality of moral values; Aquino & 
Reed, 2002) and situational influences (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973). 
Recently, however, a number of studies on moral self-regulation have demonstrated that 
one’s recent behavioral history is an important factor in shaping current moral conduct 
(e.g., Monin & Jordan, 2009; Zhong, Liljenquist, & Cain, 2009). Interestingly, 
seemingly inconsistent effects have been reported. Moral balancing (Nisan, 1991) refers 




the likelihood of doing so in a subsequent situation (Merritt, Effron, & Monin, 2010; 
Sachdeva, Iliev, & Medin, 2009). For example, after committing to helping a foreign 
student, participants were less willing to donate money to charity (Khan & Dhar, 2006). 
In contrast, moral consistency refers to the opposite pattern. Gino, Norton, and Ariely 
(2010) demonstrated that participants who wore counterfeit sunglasses were more likely 
to cheat, compared to participants who wore branded sunglasses. In short, it appears that 
engaging in an (un)ethical act can have opposing effects on subsequent decisions. In the 
current paper, we investigate the potential reconciling role of the ethical mindset an 
individual is in as a moderator of these effects. 
Moral Self-regard 
From a social psychological perspective, moral self-regard is one element of a 
multifaceted, dynamic, and motivational self-concept (Markus & Wurf, 1987). In 
general, people strive to enhance and preserve a positive self-concept (Greenwald, 
1980) and use multiple strategies to achieve that end. For example, one may assign 
larger weights to the dimensions of the self for which one holds a favorable view, favor 
and selectively attend to self-flattering information, put down threatening others, or, 
importantly for our studies, try to match behavior with one’s aspiration levels. For those 
who place a strong emphasis on moral self-regard, behaving ethically is an important 
source of self-worth (Crocker & Knight, 2005). An individual’s moral aspiration level 
does not only motivate ethical behavior, but also serves as a reference point against 
which the position of the actual self can be evaluated (Higgins, 1996). Moral self-regard 
is a function of this evaluation, with moral self-regard improving when moral self-
perception approaches or exceeds the aspiration level. People tend to experience 




Klass, 1978) and in some cases engage in moral behaviors to compensate for previous 
failures (i.e., moral balancing).  
Cultivating the moral self often conflicts with pursuing immediate self-interest. 
To understand how individuals solve that conflict, it is important to consider that the 
moral aspiration level does not equate to moral perfection, but rather to a reasonable 
level of moral behavior (Nisan, 1991) for that individual. The moral self-regulation 
literature has repeatedly argued that people tune their actions for their moral self-
perception to fluctuate around the moral aspiration level. A moral slip motivates 
corrective behavior, while (self-perceived) ethical behavior liberates one to engage in a 
subsequent, less moral action (e.g., Merritt, et al., 2010; Sachdeva, et al., 2009).  
Other research has suggested an alternative role for past behavior; as a source of 
information to learn about the self (Bem, 1972). In this perspective individuals infer 
their moral status by analyzing their previous behavior. Because of the established 
finding that people prefer their current behavior to be consistent with their previous 
behavior, and that they use behavioral consistency as a decision heuristic (Albarracín & 
Wyer, 2000; Cialdini, Trost, & Newsom, 1995) this can result in a preference for 
consistency in moral behavior. Gino, et al. (2010) account for the increase of cheating 
when participants wear counterfeit sunglasses by suggesting that wearing counterfeit 
goods sends a certain signal to the self about the self (“apparently I am a cheater”). The 
effect was observed even when participants did not choose which glasses to wear, but 
were assigned a counterfeit product by the experimenter. Other studies have shown that 
a person’s behavior can be manipulated even more subtly, by retroactively suggesting a 
re-attribution of a previous act by means of a social label (Cornelissen, Dewitte, 
Warlop, & Yzerbyt, 2007). This provokes subsequent choices that are consistent with 




In short, an (un)ethical act can have opposing effects on subsequent behavior. In 
some instances, we observe moral consistency, whereas in other cases, moral balancing 
occurs. How can these seemingly contradictory observations be reconciled? We suggest 
that the individual’ ethical mindset moderates the influence of an initial behavior on 
subsequent actions. 
Moral Frameworks and Ethical Mindsets 
Two prominent frameworks in (Western) moral philosophy are deontology and 
consequentialism (e.g., Hunt & Vitell, 2006; Singer, 1991). In a deontological 
perspective, what makes an act right is its conformity to a moral norm (Alexander & 
Moore, 2008). Moral behavior follows principles that impose duties and obligations, 
such as not to break promises, not to lie, and not to harm the innocent. In other words, 
when taking a deontological perspective an individual adopts a rule-based mindset. In a 
consequentialist framework, whether an act is morally right depends on the 
consequences of that act (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008). In other words, when taking a 
consequentialist perspective, one behaves according to an outcome-based mindset. Past 
work has demonstrated that this distinction is not exclusively philosophical, but that 
individuals consider it meaningful when reflecting on their behavior (Spranca, Minsk, & 
Baron, 1991).  
We propose that the ethical mindset one adopts moderates whether engaging in 
an (un)ethical act leads to moral balancing or moral consistency. An outcome-based 
mindset produces an appraisal of the consequences of each behavioral alternative, both 
for the individual and for others involved, and of what those alternatives would imply 
for the moral self. When confronted with a goal conflict between cultivating the moral 
self and pursuing self-interest, thinking in terms of outcomes allows the individual to be 




2006; Monin & Jordan, 2009). Balancing both motives over time permits establishing 
an acceptable compromise between both. Hence, after choosing an ethical course of 
action which benefitted mostly others, the individual feels more licensed to compensate 
and benefit self-interest. We predict that individuals in an outcome-based mindset treat 
their previous behavior as a signal that indicates whether they are morally licensed or 
need to morally compensate.   
Moral rules, on the other hand, do not easily lend themselves to such trade-offs 
(Baron & Spranca, 1997; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000). A rule 
derives its validity from its generalization across different instances (Shaw, 1993). In a 
rule-based mindset, inconsistently following (ethical) rules threatens an individual’s 
sense of psychological integrity (Festinger, 1957). Additionally, research suggests that 
once individuals internalize deontological rules, they follow them rather mindlessly and, 
when questioned, experience difficulties in justifying why they follow that rule (Haidt, 
2001). We predict that individuals in a rule-based mindset use their previous behavior 
as a guide and are more likely to behave in a morally consistent manner.  
We tested these predictions in three laboratory studies. 
Study 1 
In this study we tested our hypothesis that a consequential mindset leads to 
moral balancing, whereas a deontological mindset results in moral consistency. We first 
measured participants’ dominant ethical mindset. We then asked participants to recall an 
(un)ethical act in which they had recently engaged and observed how that influenced 
levels of ethical behavior in a subsequent task. We expected those participants identified 
as being in a rule-based mindset to use the ethicality of their recalled behavior as a 




those who recalled an unethical act. For those in an outcome-based mindset, we 
expected the opposite effect. 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 86 undergraduate students participated in a one-hour study in return 
for a 4€ show-up fee. They were seated in semi-closed cubicles in front of a computer. 
We first measured participants’ dominant ethical mindset using a moral dilemma 
scenario (the Trolley Dilemma). After 20 minutes of non-related filler tasks, we asked 
participants to recall either an ethical or unethical behavior in which they had recently 
engaged. We subsequently observed behavior in a Dictator Game (DG). 
Materials 
The trolley dilemma. The trolley dilemma (Thomson, 1986) was designed to pit 
consequentialist and deontological ethics against each other. Participants are asked to 
imagine the following scenario: A runaway trolley is headed for five people who will be 
killed if it proceeds on its present course. The only way to save them is to hit a switch 
that will turn the trolley onto an alternate set of tracks where it will kill one person 
instead of five. Consequential ethics prescribes flipping the switch as the appropriate 
behavior because the consequences of that act, the death of one person, are less 
undesirable than the consequences of doing nothing (i.e., the death of five people). 
Deontological ethics maintains that doing something that hurts an innocent person is 
wrong, so flipping the switch is ethically unacceptable. Participants were asked whether 
it is morally appropriate to flip the switch. Those who believed that it was appropriate 
were assumed to generally employ an outcome-based mindset. Those who believed it 
was not appropriate were assumed to employ a rule-based mindset. 
Dictator Game. Participants were randomly paired with another participant in 




individual in their pair would be assigned the role of the decider. The decider would 
receive 10 coins of 50 eurocent each, and would decide on the division of that money 
between them in whatever way s/he chose. All participants were told that they were 
assigned the role of the decider and were asked to indicate how many coins they wanted 
to give to the receiver. At the end of the session, participants were paid according to the 
allocations made in the game. 
Results 
Based on their responses to the trolley dilemma, out of 86 participants, we 
classified 48 (56%) as having a dominant outcome-based mindset and 38 (44%) as 
having a rule-based mindset. An ANOVA on the number of coins given to the receiver 
showed a significant interaction effect of ethical mindset and ethicality of the recalled 
behavior (F(1, 82) = 8.71, p < .01, η
2 = .10, see Figure 1). Those in an outcome-based 
mindset gave less coins after recalling an ethical act (M = 2.37, SD = 2.31) than after 
recalling an unethical act (M = 3.71, SD = 2.13, F(1, 46) = 4.29, p < .05). Participants 
in a rule-based mindset gave more coins after recalling an ethical act (M = 3.18, SD = 
2.40) than after recalling an unethical act (M = 1.76, SD = 1.92, F(1, 36) = 4.63, p < 
.04). There was no main effect of ethicality of the recalled behavior (F < 1) nor of 
ethical mindset (F(1, 82) = 1.50, p = .22, η
2 = .02). 
---------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
Our findings support our predictions. Participants in an outcome-based mindset 
showed a balancing effect: recalling something unethical they did in the past made them 




rule-based mindset showed a consistency effect: those recalling an ethical act were more 
generous than those recalling an unethical act.  
Study 2 
The goal of the second study was to provide additional evidence for the role of 
ethical mindsets as a moderator of moral dynamics, rather than being a proxy of the true 
moderator, by manipulating instead of measuring them (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 
2005). 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 107 undergraduate students participated under the same conditions as 
in Study 1. First, we manipulated ethical mindset (rule-based versus outcome-based) 
and ethicality of an initial act (ethical or unethical). We asked half of our participants to 
remember an episode in the past where they did something ethical, and the other half to 
remember an episode where they did something unethical. In addition, half of the 
individuals in each group were instructed to think about a behavior that was (un)ethical 
“because it hurt/benefitted other people” (outcome-based). The others thought about a 
behavior that was (un)ethical “because you did not/did your duty to follow an ethical 
norm or principle” (rule-based). As a dependent measure, participants made an 
allocation decision in a DG. Participants were also asked to respond to the Trolley 
Dilemma as a manipulation check for our mindset manipulation.  
Induction of ethical mindsets 
To induce the appropriate mindset, we provided elaborate instructions. The 
instructions defined ethicality as either a function of consequences or in terms of rule 
compliancy, and provided three prototypical examples. Subsequently, we asked 
participants to provide an example of a behavior – not necessarily their own – that is 




intended mindset in participants before they reflected on their own behavior. 
Additionally, to reinforce the mindset manipulation, in the outcome-based condition we 
asked them who was benefited or hurt in their example, and in the rule-based condition 
we asked which rule was respected or violated. We then asked participants to recall an 
instance in their own recent past when they themselves behaved (un)ethically, either 
because of the consequences or because of the rule compliancy of that behavior. Again 
we asked them who benefited and who were hurt in the outcome-based condition, and 
which rule was followed or violated in the rule-based condition. In a control condition, 
participants were asked to describe what they do on a typical Friday. 
Results and Discussion 
As a manipulation check we analyzed participants’ judgments in the trolley 
dilemma. The proportion of participants that considered it appropriate to flip the switch 
(i.e., those who followed outcome-based arguments) was 67% (16 out of 24) in the 
control group, 78% (31 out of 40) in the outcome-based group and 50% (21 out of 42) 
in the rule-based group (χ
2(2) = 6.00; p < 0.05). This suggests that the manipulation was 
successful. 
An ANOVA analyzing the effect of the 4 experimental and the control condition 
on the number of coins donated in the DG was statistically significant (F(4, 102) = 3.23, 
p < .02, η
2 = .11, see Figure 2).  
---------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Simple contrasts did not indicate differences between the control condition and 
the experimental conditions
i. To further analyze the obtained effects, we dropped the 




the recollected behavior on the number of coins given in the DG. There were no main 
effects of ethical mindset or ethicality (F’s < 1), but the interaction effect of both factors 
was significant (F(1, 79) = 12.09, p < .01, η
2 = .13; see Figure 2). Participants in an 
outcome-based mindset gave more coins in the DG after they recalled an unethical act 
(M = 3.47, SD = 1.78) than those who recalled an ethical act (M = 1.86, SD = 1.96; F(1, 
39) = 4.94, p = .03). In other words, participants in an outcome-based mindset showed a 
moral balancing effect. In contrast, participants in a rule-based mindset gave more coins 
in the DG after recalling an ethical act (M = 3.20, SD = 1.91) than after recalling an 
unethical act (M = 1.91, SD = 1.93; F(1, 40) = 7.32, p = .01). In other words, these 
participants showed a moral consistency effect. 
After replicating our hypothesized moderation effect, we wanted to evaluate the 
generalizability of our findings by changing the context to cheating behavior. Also, we 
wanted to test our initial idea about the underlying mechanism. To do so, we measured 
moral self-regard in the third study. 
Study 3 
Participants and Procedure 
A total of 135 undergraduate students participated under the same lab set up and 
fee as Studies 1 and 2. We manipulated ethical mindset and ethicality of a recalled act 
with the same task used in Study 2. We then observed behavior in a cheating task and 
measured participants’ moral self-regard. 
Materials 
Cheating task. We used a cheating task adapted from Mazar, Amir, and Ariely 
(2008). We gave participants a sheet with 20 matrices containing 12 three-digit 
numbers. They had four minutes to find a pair of numbers in each matrix that added up 




minutes, they self-reported the number of solved matrices on the computer and threw 
the worksheet in a recycling bin. After the experiment was done, we retrieved the 
worksheets. Based on one number on the sheets that differed for each participant we 
matched the worksheets with the participants and calculated the extent to which 
participants had overstated their performance. 
Moral self-regard. We measured moral self-regard with the personality items of 
Aquino and Reed’s (2002) moral identity scale. In order to assess the discrepancy of 
perceived self with the aspired self we asked participants to answer on a 7-point scale 
“Compared to the person I would like to be, right now I feel…” for nine traits: Caring, 
Compassionate, Fair, Friendly, Generous,  Hardworking, Helpful, Honest, Kind.  
Results 
There was a significant effect of our manipulation on the degree of over-
reporting performance (i.e., cheating; F(4, 130) = 2,51; p < .05, η
2 = .07, see Figure 3). 
As in Study 2, simple contrasts did not indicate significant differences between the 
control condition and the experimental conditions
ii. We dropped the control condition to 
further analyze the effects of our manipulations. There were no main effects of ethical 
mindset or ethicality of the recalled behavior (F’s < 1), but the interaction effect of both 
was significant (F(1, 103) = 8.10; p < .01, η
2 = .07, see Figure 3) and replicated the 
pattern found in Studies 1 and 2. Participants in a rule-based mindset cheated to a 
smaller extent after recalling an ethical act (M = 1.00, SD = 2.25) than after recalling an 
unethical act (M = 2.23, SD = 2.10, F(1, 51) = 4.22; p < .05), thus displaying a 
consistency effect. Those in an outcome-based mindset cheated more after recalling an 
ethical act (M = 1.74, SD = 2.03) than after recalling an unethical act (M = 0.74, SD = 
1.68, F(1, 52) = 3.89; p = .05), in line with a balancing effect.  




Please insert Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Interestingly, we found a main effect of ethicality of the recalled act on 
participants’ moral self-regard (F(1, 102) = 11.64; p < .01, η
2 = .10). As expected, those 
recalling an ethical act considered themselves to be more ethical individuals (M = 4.77, 
SD = .77) than those recalling an unethical act (M = 4.28, SD = .72). Neither the effect 
of ethical mindset (F(1, 102) = 1.60, p = .21) nor the interaction between ethical 
mindset and ethicality (F < 1) was significant. A moderated mediation analysis 
(Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) revealed a conditional indirect effect of ethicality of 
the recalled act on the level of cheating, mediated by participants’ moral self-regard, see 
Figure 4. The mediation was conditional on participants’ ethical mindset. More 
specifically, both the effects of ethicality of the recalled act on moral self-regard (b = -
0.49, SE = 0.15, p < .01), and the interaction effect of moral self-regard and ethical 
mindset on overstating of correctly solved matrices (b = -1.11, SE = 0.53, p < .05) were 
significant. The indirect effect of ethicality of the recalled act on cheating, mediated by 
moral self-regard, was significant in the outcome-based condition (Z = -2.12, p < .05), 
but not in the rule-based condition (Z = -.41, p = .68). 
---------------------------------------------- 
Please insert Figure 4 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
Discussion 
This study demonstrates that the moderating effect of ethical mindsets extends to 
other areas of ethical behavior, such as cheating. Additionally, we tested the mediating 
role of moral self-regard in the shaping of balancing and consistency effects. Individuals 




behavior. A positive self-regard liberates the individual temporarily from the need to 
cultivate the moral self, and allows pursuing selfish interests without suffering aversive 
affective consequences. A negative level activates a mechanism to restore the moral 
self-regard, leading to more ethical behavior. In contrast, in a rule-based mindset, a 
parsimonious response based on behavioral consistency results in moral consistency 
effects. 
General Discussion 
In this paper, we provided empirical support for the hypothesis that ethical 
mindsets moderate how an individual’s behavioral history shapes current ethical 
behavior. A rule-based mindset facilitates moral consistency effects, whereas an 
outcome-based mindset leads to moral balancing. This was demonstrated both when 
measuring participants’ ethical mindset as an individual difference variable (Study 1) 
and after manipulating it (Study 2 and 3), establishing its causal role. 
The framework we developed reconciles two streams of literature that produced 
seemingly conflicting findings (moral balancing and moral consistency). The insights 
provided by this paper help predict under which conditions we can expect larger moral 
consistency, and understand why. Further, we demonstrate that the two dominant 
perspectives in (Western) moral philosophy (i.e., consequentialism and deontology) find 
a counterpart in individuals’ cognition, and that the mindset adopted may have 
important behavioral implications. Future research should study whether stable 
interindividual differences exist regarding the dominance of either mindset, or whether 
environmental factors (including the framing of messages in campaigns promoting 
ethical behavior) mostly determine which mindset is employed. We also speculated on 




construct in moral balancing and consistency effects. Further research is required to 
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Figure 1. The interaction effect of ethical mindset and ethicality of the recalled act on 









































Figure 2. The interaction effect of recalling an (un)ethical act and ethical mindset on the 





















































Figure 3. The interaction effect of recalling an (un)ethical act and ethical mindset on 

















































Note. * p < .05, ** p < .0 
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